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THE DOCTOR WON'T SEE YOU NOW:
ERISA PERMITS HMOS TO GIVE DOCTORS
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO LIMIT HEALTH CARE
JUNE M. SULLIVAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Health care is an important issue in America today. It is
passionately debated in the political arena.1 Each candidate proclaims
that his or her reform package will cure the faulty system. 2 How the
health care issue will be addressed in the coming years is unknown.
Perhaps the constituents will speak with their votes by casting out of
office those officials who fail to address the availability of health care to
all Americans. Perhaps physicians and other health care professionals
will help to drive the legislators by rebelling against the managed care
companies. Whatever the outcome, many people can agree that health
care is a top priority in America today. 3 Health care costs have risen to a
level that necessitates restraint on spending. 4 We cannot return to the
days when spending of health care dollars went unchecked. If we do,
surely a severe health care crisis could cripple the entire nation.
In the past, Americans endured soaring health care costs that were
brought about by an unrestrained spending of medical dollars. 5 People
trusted their physician's judgments. 6 Since the physician was thought of
as an "expert," it was believed that the physician knew what was best for
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1. See Richard Wolf, Ted Kennedy Says Nominee Continues Party's Crusade, USA TODAY,
August 16, 2000, at 5A; Carol Lin, Election 2000: Families USA Director Discusses Bush, Gore Health
Care Plans, (CNN Early Edition, September 5, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, CNN
Transcript # 00090503V08); Daniel S. Greenberg, Gore Scores in Voter Polls With Health-Care
Proposals, 356 THE LANcET 837 (2000).
2. See sources cited supra note 1.
3. Patricia Norris, Top Issues: Education, Health Care, SUNDAY REPutLIcAN, September 10, 2000,
at Al. The results of a telephone survey of 550 people in Hampden County, Massachusetts showed
that 45% of those polled expressed that Health Care is their top priority. Id.
4. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 168, 181 (2d ed. 1998).
5. Id. at 168.
6. Andrea K. Marsh, Sacrificing Patients for Profits: Physician Incentives to Limit Care and
ERISA Fiduciary Duty, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1323, 1333 (1999).
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the patient.7 The physician prescribed the best course of treatment for
the ailment, and the patient counted on the diagnosis and treatment to
comply with standard medical practice. 8 Thus, a patient did not have to
doubt that the medical care provided by the physician was comprehen-
sive. Indeed, the public demanded that the treatment conform to well-
established standards. 9 Any deviation from the accepted procedures
may put that physician at risk for medical malpractice claims.10
It is a logical conclusion that for many physicians, the fear of mal-
practice encouraged the use of diagnostic tests and expensive pro-
cedures. 11 By examining all of the possible medical issues, the physician
was more than likely to detect and treat any problems that may have
existed.12 Therefore, it was wise for the physician to order comprehen-
sive procedures.1 3 Not only did the patient gain extensive medical care
and peace of mind, the physician decreased his odds for a medical
malpractice suit.14
The physicians controlled much of how the health care system
worked. In the past, many physicians were paid as fee-for-service.1 5 It
would appear that the extensive fee-for-service health care delivery bene-
fitted physicians perhaps more so than patients.16 Not only did physi-
cians screen all possible aspects of the ailment; they also put money in
their own pockets. "The practice of reimbursing physicians according
to the services they rendered set up incentives for physicians to render as
many services as possible; physicians got paid more if they had more
encounters with each patient and provided more services for each."17
More care to the patients created more reimbursement of dollars to the
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1331-32.
9. See HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 4, at 792. The authors explain:
Although there is no blueprint for it and much doubt about how well it works, a
complex, socially maintained system of rewards and punishments operates, directly and
indirectly, to protect and promote the quality of health care. The main elements of this
system are direct government regulation, tort law, and consumer choice.
Id.
10. Id. at 992.
11. Id.
12. Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22 AM. J.
L. & MEo. 399, 415 (1996).
13. Id.
14. HAVIGHMST ET AL., supra note 4, at 929.
[A] medical provider is liable for injury to a patient if the injury was the result of failure
to meet the "due" standard of care. But if the injury is judged an adverse outcome
consistent with the normal risk of non-negligent care, then the medical provider is not
liable and the patient bears the cost.
Id.
15. LAmHAM, supra note 12, at 400.
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting GERALD R. PETERS, HEALTH CARE INTEGRATION 420 (1995)).
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physicians.18 The patients felt confident that their medical needs were
sufficiently attended, and the physicians gained financial security. It was
a win-win situation.
The patients' medical care was typically covered by private insur-
ance, and therefore there was no incentive for patients to question addi-
tional medical procedures.1 9 Patients had no reason to defray any costs
because there was typically little or no out-of-pocket expense for the
patients to receive expensive health care procedures. 20 Patients only felt
the impact of medical costs through required copayments and deducti-
bles and through their share of premium payments.21 Since there was no
financial incentive for patients or physicians to restrain health care costs,
there was no limit as to how much health care service was provided. 22
Patients and physicians both received benefits.
That era of health care delivery is a mere memory. The result of
the physicians' free reign on health care delivery was a non-competitive
market that produced skyrocketing health care costs and created a crisis
in the health care industry.23 "U.S. health care spending . .. currently
totals over $1 trillion per year ... doubl[ing] since about 1987."24 With
the aging of the population and increased life expectancy, the cost of
health care will only increase in the years ahead. 25 It is estimated that by
2002 health care costs will reach $1.5 trillion. 26 "Spending on health
care has reached nearly fourteen percent of this country's Gross
Domestic Product."27 Thus, there is an urgent need to restrain health
care costs.
The Medicare 28 and Medicaid 29 programs of the 1960s brought the
government into the health care spending arena by using tax dollars to
fund health care programs. 30 Savvy politicians were aware that the voters
held them accountable for spending those dollars. Therefore, the federal
government was motivated by its own self-interest in curbing costs. The
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at400-01.
24. HAVIGHURST ET" AL., supra note 4, at 181.
25. Id. at 168. Increased spending on health care is due to the aging population, AIDS, drug
abuse, violence, environmental hazards, and new technologies. Id.
26. Id. at 181.
27. David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care,
30 U. RICm. L. REV., 155, 156 (1996).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994).
30. David Mechanic, Models of Rationing: Professional Judgement and the Rationing of Medical
Care, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1713, 1717-18 (1992).
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government pays approximately forty percent of all health care CoStS.3 1
Congress noted this economic crisis and attempted to address the need to
control health care spending by passing the federal Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973.32 Through the HMO Act, Congress support-
ed and encouraged the development of health maintenance organizations
(HMOs).33
The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (HMO Act) led
the way for dramatic changes in the delivery of health care. 34 The
HMO's innovative approaches to curtail health care costs were supported
and encouraged by the federal government. 35 The legislative and the
executive branches were receptive to methods that performed within the
budget restraints and still accommodated the health care needs of the
American people. 36 In the long run, it was assumed that the HMO Act
would improve the overall scheme of health care delivery. 37
However, the HMO Act "was principally a congressional effort to
encourage and subsidize a particular vision of how health care should be
delivered, not an invitation to entrepreneurs to submit innovative ways of
packaging and paying for health care." 38 With Congress' blessing on
the development of HMOs, the American public said farewell to health
care delivery as it once was and cautiously ushered in a new era of
medical delivery restraint. The medical community, as well as the
medical consumers, no longer had free reign on health care spending. 39
Managed care programs began to spring up across the country.4 0
Currently, "of the . . . 152 million Americans who are insured through
their employers, eighty-six percent have some sort of managed-care
plan."'4 1 The new system of medical health care delivery was well on its
way.
This article will examine one case that brings into question the
reimbursement scheme of the new era of HMOs.42 The recent U.S.
31. Id. at 1718.
32. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
33. HAVIGHURST Er AL., supra note 4, at 1267.
34. Id. at 1268.
35. Id. at 1267. "The HMO Act represented an effort by the federal government to encourage
the development of HMOs through a variety of measures, including the provision of financial
subsidies." Id.
36. Id. at 1268 (explaining that "the HMO Act was an example of regulation that modified the
peculiar medical market so as to allow a more socially optimal delivery system to emerge").
37. Id.
38. Id. at 215-16.
39. Id. at 213-14. "[The ... feature that distinguishes [HMOs] from conventional health
insurance is a contractual commitment to provide or arrange for care." Id.
40. Id. at 216.
41. Susan Brink, To Get Top Care, Get Pushy, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, July 17, 2000, at 72.
42. See infra Parts IV-V.
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Supreme Court decision of Pegram v. Herdrich43 determined that
patients cannot sue their HMOs under federal law for breach of fiduciary
duty when the HMOs implement managed care programs in which
physicians receive financial incentives to provide medical care to HMO
enrollees in a cost effective manner.44 This article will discuss the
ramifications the decision will have on health care, ethical implications,
and its effect on the patient-physician relationship. Part II will give an
overview of the background of managed care, physician incentives, the
fiduciary role of the physician, and the impact of ERISA. Part III will
discuss the Seventh Circuit's decision in Herdrich v. Pegram.45 Part IV
will examine the Supreme Court's decision in Pegram v. Herdrich. Part
V will give a conclusion and suggest further steps to address the issues in
Pegram v. Herdrich.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE EVOLUTION OF HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS
Prior to 1980, many Americans received health care through the
traditional fee-for-service model. 46 Most workers purchased private
health insurance through their employers. 47 The employers contracted
with insurers to provide medical insurance. 48  Under this system,
"[i]nsurers paid physicians on a fee-for-service basis, under which the
physician set the charges for the services and was paid in full for all
services rendered. Because insurance insulated both beneficiaries and
providers from the costs of care, it created no incentives to reduce
services to contain costs." 49 Physicians controlled their own income by
providing more services, whether or not those services were essential or
excessive. 50 Traditionally, the patient did not question the physician's
decisions because it was believed that more health care meant better
health.5 1 The insurance company relied on the physician's professional
judgment to determine whether the procedures were warranted. 52
"[T]he medical profession, claiming special expertise and high ethical
43. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
44. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 234-37.
45. Herdrich v. Pegran, 154 F 3d 362, 370 (1998).
46. Latham, supra note 12, at 400.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Deven C. McGraw, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians be Required to
Disclose these to Patients?, 83 GEO. L. J. 1821, 1822 (1995).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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principles, succeeded in establishing its cultural authority and its political
influence and in preempting decision-making authority over a wide
variety of economically important matters." 53
Many critics believe that it was this reimbursement scheme and the
physicians' free reign on health care delivery that led to soaring health
care costs. 5 4 The use of high technology also increased health care
spending and furthered the need to control health care costs.5 5 During
the 1960s, insurance companies and the federal government searched for
methods to restrain health care expenses.56
Henry J. Kaiser, during World War II, developed one plan that was
examined. 57 It offered "a group practice prepayment plan to [the
Kaiser] shipyard workers on the West Coast. From [this developed] the
nonprofit Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., now an industry
leader." 58  Other plans had similar reimbursement schemes that
replaced fee-for-service payments with a fixed payment schedule. 59
"In the late 1960s, Paul Ellwood, M.D., coined the name 'health
maintenance organization' and brought the idea of encouraging prepaid
'alternative delivery systems' to the attention of the Nixon administra-
tion. . . . Ellwood and others saw them as vehicles for introducing
competitive forces into the health care market as a whole." 60 Congress
recognized these payment schemes as viable alternatives to the
fee-for-service plan. 61 Congress supported and encouraged the
development of HMOs by enacting the Health Maintenance Organiza-
tion Act of 1973.62 Since that time, various HMO reimbursement
systems have come into existence. Approximately 165 million
Americans receive their health care through HMOs and other managed
care organizations. 63 A large portion of the population, roughly forty
53. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 4, at 64.
54. LATHAM, supra note 12, at 400-01. "Managed care... arose in response to the skyrocketing
health costs to which... FFS [fee-for-service] incentives had contributed." Id.
55. McGraw, supra note 49, at 1822.
56. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 4, at 215.
57. Id. at 215.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1267. Federal law mandated a dual choice policy that required any employer with
more than twenty-five employees to offer an HMO option as part of its health benefits. Id. at 1267-68.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994 & Supp. V 1999). See also McGraw, supra note 49, at 1822-23. "In
the early 1970s, the federal government embraced the concept of health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) as a strategy to deliver health care efficiently and effectively." Id.
63. Timothy S. Hall, Third-Party Payor Conflicts of Interest in Managed Care: A Proposal for
Regulation Based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 95, 100 (1998).
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percent, is enrolled in either an HMO or a Preferred Provider Organiza-
tion (PPO).64
B. MANAGED CARE PHYSICIAN INCENTIVES
HMOs are categorized as one type of managed care reimbursement
system. 65 The phrase "[m]anaged care has become a vague term for
almost any system in which third parties pay for medical care, other than
the 'traditional' system of nearly unquestioning payment on a fee-for-
service basis for anything ordered by a licensed physician." 66 "The
financial incentives in a managed care system are aimed at discouraging
the physician from doing everything possible, and instead aim at encour-
aging the physician to provide the 'right' amount of care." 67 These
financial incentives take three general approaches: salary, capitation, and
fee-for-service. 68
1. Salary Payment System
A salary system sets the physicians' incomes. The plan either
employs physicians directly or pays them salary-like compensation as
independent contractors. 69 In either form, costs are controlled in two
ways.70 First, the physician-employee has an incentive to keep his or her
job by adhering to utilization measures that are used by the managed
care organization to determine whether to renew the physician's
contract. 71 Second, the physician typically earns the same amount of
money whether he or she works thirty-five hours per week or eighty-five
hours per week.72 The incentive is to spend as few hours as possible in
earning the salary. 73 Therefore, "there is an incentive to provide less
access of care to the patient population." 74 The physician is financially
encouraged to spend less time with patients. 75
64. Orentlicher, supra note 27, at 157. "The term Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) refers
to a health care plan in which the insurer enters into contracts with physicians, hospitals, and other
health care providers to provide services to the plan's members." Id. at 157-58 n.15.
65. Latham, supra note 12, at 401.
66. Henry T. Greely, Symposium: On Physician Decision-Making and Managed Care: Direct
Financial Incentives in Managed Care: Unanswered Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53, 55 (1996).
67. Id. at 56.
68. Latham, supra note 12, at 402.
69. Id.
70. Hall, supra note 63, at 103.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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2. Capitation Payment System
Under a capitation payment system, a physician is paid a fixed
amount of money for each patient. 76 The physician is required to
provide certain services that are listed in his or her contract. 77 If the
physician can render those services for less than the fixed amount he or
she is paid, then the physician gets to keep the excess money. 78 If those
services cost the physician more than the fixed payment, the physician
must absorb the lost revenue. 79 The incentive is to decrease utilization of
services. 80 Thus, the physician is financially encouraged to provide
fewer services.
3. Fee-For-Service Payment System
The fee-for-service payment scheme is widely found in preferred
provider organizations (PPOs).81 The payment in fee-for-service is
negotiated between the managed care organization and the physician. 82
Typically, the physician's fee is discounted from the standard rate of
service.83 But, there still remains a financial incentive for the physician
to provide more services, whether or not they are required. 84
Variations of the three different payment systems also may be
found. For instance, a bonus system may be combined with either sal-
ary, capitation, or fee-for-service. 85 Depending on the plan's financial
results for the year and the physicians' contribution to the financial gain
of the plan, the physicians may receive a bonus. 86 A profit sharing
system allots a negotiated share of the plan's profits to the physicians
who "may receive that share as owners . . . or otherwise." 87 Many
HMOs either use one reimbursement scheme or combine more than one
scheme to reimburse the physician. 88 In any case, it is clear that the goal
76. Latham, supra note 12, at 402.
77. Id. at 402-03.
78. Hall, supra note 63, at 103.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 102.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Latham, supra note 12, at 402; Hall, supra note 63, at 102.
85. Greely, supra note 66, at 59.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 60. "The GAO [General Accounting Office] report cited three pieces of general
evidence that financial incentives were commonly used by HMOs." Id.
[VOL. 77:267274
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of the HMOs is to reduce costs by reducing services. 89 Since the physi-
cians deliver the services, the physicians play a major role in the
reduction of services.
The physicians have a financial incentive not to treat patients.90
"[F]inancial incentives to limit care discourage physicians from
providing high levels of care by transferring from the health plan to the
physician some of the financial risk of costly medical care." 91 But a
question remains, what about the duty of a physician to treat the patient?
C. THE IMPACT OF ERISA
1. ERISA Preempts State Law
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)92 in 1974 to provide uniform federal requirements for large
employers that have workers in several states.93 Large employers who
have employees in different states are mandated to adhere to the uniform
federal requirements under ERISA.94 It was originally aimed at prviding
consistent regulations for employees' pension funds and benefit plans. 95
The employer must adhere to the federal standards rather than comply
with the regulations of each state.96 ERISA supersedes any and all state
laws.97 Therefore, any employee who sues his or her employer or health
plan for health care benefits that are covered under ERISA must sue
under federal law, not state law. 98
When ERISA was first enacted, most large employers purchased
health insurance for their employees from either Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans or from commercial health insurers. 99 Congress did not
originally intend for ERISA to cover health care benefits. 100 But over
time, large employers recognized the advantages of self-insuring their
89. Id. at 56. "[Tlhe key is structuring the physician's compensation in ways that create
incentives to practice economically." Id.
90. Id.
91. Orentlicher, supra note 27, at 160.
92. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (1974)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
93. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 4, at 66.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 1998) (removing the case to federal court
because ERISA is a federal law).
98. Id.
99. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 4, at 66.
100. Id. "A striking feature of ERISA for present purposes is that it was not enacted as a health
care measure at all." Id.
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employees' health benefits.101 Not only does ERISA allow the employer
to escape state insurance regulation and state health insurance laws, but it
also allows the employer to be free from state premium taxes that apply
to health insurers. 102 "As a result, approximately 70% of the roughly
160 million Americans covered by employer-sponsored health plans are
in self-insured plans enjoying the benefits of ERISA (including relief
from some $3 billion per year in premium taxes)."103 However, if the
ERISA-protected health plans had been required to adhere to state
regulations, many of the innovative approaches that occurred in health
care plans in the 1970s may not have been possible.104
ERISA is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it allows busi-
nesses to provide for cost-effective alternatives to traditional health insur-
ance.10 5 On the other hand, it prevents employees from bringing causes
of action under state law when their health care plan fails to provide
benefits.106 Large companies that self-insure their employees' health
benefits may use ERISA as a shield for protection against state health
insurance law. 107
In comparison, small companies that are not capable of self-insur-
ing are subject to state regulations that increase the cost of health care
insurance. 108 Many times this increased cost makes health insurance
beyond the means of the employers and their employees. 109 As a result,
numerous small companies do not offer health care benefits at all.' 10
2. Fiduciary Duty as Defined Under ERISA
The fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act (ERISA) II1 is broad. 112 A person is a fiduciary, under ERISA, if
101. Id. at 66-67.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 67.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 68.
106. Id. at 67-68. "[S]ome would argue that the resulting legal regime... is ... inadequate to
deal with many issues and with many grievances requiring legal redress." Id.
107. Id. at 66-68.
108. Id. at 68.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 29 U.S.C. 1104 (a)(1)(A)-(C) (1994).
112. 29 U.S.C. 1002 (21)(A) (1994) provides that:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or
exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets ...
or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.
276 [VOL. 77:267
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he or she has discretionary authority or control over either plan manage-
ment or administration. 113 Congress, through the Chairman of the
House Committee on Education and Labor in 1974, expressed an intent
to have the term fiduciary interpreted broadly. 114
Congress intended for ERISA to govern employee pension and
welfare benefits plans; therefore, fiduciary responsibility under ERISA is
defined in terms of the common law of trusts.11 5 The duty to inform is
the common thread between the ERISA beneficiary and the trustee.11 6
Along with the duty to inform, there is a duty not to misinform, when the
trustee knows that silence might be harmful. 117
Under ERISA, the fiduciary must act with the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to plan participants and beneficiaries. 118 The fiduci-
ary is held accountable to plan participants if the fiduciary fails to fulfill
his or her duty." 9 In some instances, the fiduciary has a duty to advise
the beneficiary of factors that compromise the fiduciary's role. 120 One
example would be a conflict of the fiduciary's own interest with the
interest of the beneficiary. This circumstance occurs when the physi-
cian's financial reimbursement is jeopardized when the physician advises
a treatment plan that deviates from the HMO's managed care scheme.121
The physician must weigh his or her own financial welfare against the
patient's medical welfare.122
Consequently, when the physician acts in a fiduciary capacity, he or
she has the obligation to disclose to the beneficiary any circumstance
that would compromise the physician's role as fiduciary.123 The patient,
as the beneficiary, has the right to know that the physician is making
113. Id.
114. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 370 (1998) (reciting the statement of the Chairman of the
House Committee on Education and Labor in 1974).
115. Employee Retirement Income Security Program, Protection of Employee Benefit Rights,
Regulatory Provisions, Fiduciary Responsibility, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1994).
120. Id.
121. See generally Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997). The case involves a wife who
sued her husband's HMO when the husband's general practitioner physician, who was under contract
with the HMO, refused to refer the husband to a cardiac specialist. Id. at 626-27. The HMO gave the
general practitioner a financial bonus for not referring patients to specialists. Id. at 627. The husband
suffered typical signs and symptoms of cardiac disease, had a family history of cardiac disease, and
had specifically asked for a referral to a heart specialist. Id. at 626. The general practitioner refused
to give the cardiac referral based on the patient's age (forty years old) and lack of severe symptoms.
Id. The husband died a few months later from heart failure. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that since the
patient relied on the general practitioner's advice about treatment options, the patient had a right to
know whether the doctor's advice was "influenced by selfserving financial considerations created by
the health insurance provider." Id. at 629.
122. Id. at 628.
123. Id.
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decisions with an eye toward financial gain.1 24 The patient must be
informed of the influence that the reimbursement scheme of the HMO
has on the physician's treatment decisions. 125
D. THE GENERAL FIDUCIARY ROLE OF THE PHYSICIAN
A fiduciary is defined as "one who owes to another the duties of
good faith, trust, confidence, and candor or one who must exercise a
high standard of care in managing another's money or property."126 A
fiduciary relationship typically exists under four circumstances. First,
"when one person places trust in the faithful integrity of another, who as
a result gains superiority or influence over the first." 127 Second, "when
one person assumes control and responsibility over another."128 Third,
"when one person has a duty to act for or give advice to another on
matters falling within the scope of the relationship."12 9 Last, "when
there is a specific relationship that has traditionally been recognized as
involving fiduciary duties, as with a lawyer and a client." 130
The physician-patient relationship clearly falls under all four
categories. The typical patient normally has only limited knowledge of
medical procedures because he or she is not trained in the medical
profession. Often, the patient's medical insight consists of information
gained from neighbors, friends, relatives, the popular press, and the
internet. The patient, therefore, places his or her trust in the physician
who has not only extensive knowledge but also years of expertise in a
particular area. 131 The physician holds the key to the patient's medical
future. The patient makes medical decisions based on the information
that the learned physician shares with the patient. 132
The patient has faith, confidence, and reliance in the physician to do
the right thing in the best interest of the patient.133 Indeed, it is the belief
that the physician will do the right thing that keeps the patient coming
back to the physician for medical care. 134 A patient who cannot depend
on his or her physician to place the patient's care above all else will soon
change physicians or become noncompliant with treatment. 135 Thus, the
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (7th ed. 1999).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Marsh, supra note 6, at 1333.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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physician-patient relationship is a bond of trust, the very same type of
trust that defines a fiduciary relationship. 136
Financial incentives that encourage the physician not to treat a
patient jeopardize the fiduciary relationship that is the core of the
physician-patient relationship.1 37 "[W]hen physicians are paid more to
do less for their patients, patient trust in physicians will naturally be
eroded as patients begin to wonder whether tests and treatments are
being withheld because they are not medically indicated or because
physicians have a financial interest in denying the care." 138 The HMO
payment schemes pit the financial well-being of the physician against the
medical well-being of the patient.139 The physician-patient relationship
may be irreparably harmed through the deterioration of the core
elements of the faith, trust, confidence, candor, and reliance that the
physician is the patient's advocate. 140
Without a solid physician-patient relationship, the physician's medi-
cal advice is ineffective.'14 The patient's faith in the medical profession
may be so shaken that he or she may fail to utilize any health care
advice, thus possibly creating an increase in disease or an advancement
of a pre-existing condition.' 4 2 The purpose of HMOs is then defeated
be-cause, in the long run, it will cost more money to change the course
of the disease or to support end of life conditions.143 The advancement
of the physician-patient relationship is the integral connection to
maintaining cost-effective health care. 144
Based on the fiduciary role of the physician, previous court deci-
sions involving fiduciary duty under ERISA and congressional intent to
have "fiduciary" interpreted broadly, it appears that the Seventh Circuit
136. Id. at 1336.
137. Id. at 1324. "A physician who receives financial incentives to limit patient care plays dual
roles of caregiver and gatekeeper, thus facing a conflict of interest." Id.
138. Orentlicher, supra note 27, at 162.
139. Id. at 160 (discussing the HMO's "financial incentives to limit care [that] discourage physi-
cians from providing high levels of care by transferring from the health plan to the physician some of
the financial risk of costly medical care").
140. Id. at 161. "Even if there is no actual harm to the patient, there may be serious harm to the
patient-physician relationship." Id.
141. Id. at 161-62.
Patients are especially needy when they are sick. ... [T]hey are especially dependent on
their physicians.... With so much at stake for the patient's welfare and so much power
in the hands of physicians, patients will not be willing to rely on their physicians'
judgment unless they can trust that physicians will use their power and authority on
behalf of their patients, placing their patients' interests above all other interests.
Id.
142. Id. at 160-62.
143. Marsh, supra note 6, at 1333. "Disruption of trust could lead to lower quality care if it
dissuades patients from seeking medical attention early or from following the advice of their
physicians." Id.
144. Id. at 1333-34.
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made the correct decision in Herdrich v. Pegram.145 However, the
Supreme Court did not agree. 146
III. HERDRICH V. PEGRAM: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
A. FACTS
On March 1, 1991, Cynthia Herdrich (Herdrich) sought the medical
attention of Dr. Lori Pegram (Pegram) for abdominal pain.i4 7 Pegram
was employed by Herdrich's health maintenance organization, Carle
Clinic Association, P.C. (Carle). 148 Pegram examined Herdrich and con-
cluded that Herdrich was indeed experiencing pain in her abdomen.14 9
Six days later, on March 7, 1991, Dr. Pegram detected a six by eight
centimeter inflamed mass in Herdrich's abdomen. 150
In spite of the fact that Herdrich's appendix was noticeably
inflamed, Pegram required Herdrich to wait eight more days before
undergoing the necessary diagnostic procedure (ultrasound) at a facility
that was staffed by Carle employees. 151 The facility was more than fifty
miles away from Herdrich's home in Urbana, Illinois.152 Another
facility that had the necessary diagnostic equipment was located close to
Herdrich's hometown at a local hospital in Bloomington, Illinois.153
However, Pegram failed to utilize that hospital.154 During this eight-day
waiting period, Herdrich's appendix ruptured, and subsequently, she
suffered from peritonitis.155 Peritonitis is an inflammation of the mem-
branes that line the abdominal cavity. 156 It is a life-threatening compli-
cation of a ruptured appendix that requires immediate treatment. 157
"Without early adequate treatment, dehydration and abdominal
distention follow rapidly ... and death follows within days."1 58
145. See generally Herdrick v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (1998). Congressional intent to broadly
interpret "fiduciary" is expressed in the 1974 statement by the Chairman of the House Committee on
Education and Labor. Id. at 370.
146. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000).
147. Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 365.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 365 n.1.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. TABER's CYcLoPEDIc MEDICAL DICIONARY 1369 (16th ed. 1989).
157. MERCK MANUAL 791 (17th ed. 1995).
158. Id. (describing the results of untreated or inadequately treated peritonitis).
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Dr. Pegram practiced under a plan that offers prepaid health
insurance. 159 The plan was managed by Carle, Health Alliance Medical
Plans, Inc. (HAMP), and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc.
(CHIMCO).160 Herdrich was covered under the plan through her
husband's employer who obtained the health plan through State Farm
Insurance Co.161 On October 21, 1992, Cynthia Herdrich, the plaintiff,
sued Dr. Pegram, Carle, HAMP, and CHIMCO, the defendants, for
medical negligence and state law fraud. 162
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Herdrich's initial two-count complaint alleged medical negligence
against the defendants. 163 She then added counts III and IV, which
alleged state fraud. 164 The defendants were able to remove the case to
federal court by asserting that ERISA preempted counts III and IV.165
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
on count IV and gave Herdrich leave to amend count 111.166 She
amended this count to "allege that the defendants had breached their
fiduciary duty to plan participants, in violation of ERISA."167 The
defendants moved to dismiss this amended count, based on the fact that
Herdrich had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 168 The trial court granted the motion and allowed the jury to
hear the remaining counts, I and II, which alleged medical negligence. 169
The jury found for Herdrich on both counts, and Herdrich thereafter
appealed the trial court's dismissal of her amended count III.170
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
dismissal and remanded the case to the lower court (on count III) for
trial. 171 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. 172
The case was argued before the Court on February 23, 2000, and
decided on June 12, 2000.173 Reversing the Seventh Circuit's decision,
159. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 367 n.3 (7th Cir. 1998).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 365.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000).
173. Id. at211.
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the Court held that Herdrich did not state an ERISA claim because
"mixed [treatment and] eligibility decisions by HMO physicians are not
fiduciary decisions under ERISA."174
C. THE MAJORITY DECISION OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
1. The Jurisdictional Issue
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the defendants argued that
Herdrich failed to file a notice of appeal for the dismissal of count III
within the requisite time period. 175 The defendants contended that the
dismissal of the complaint occurred on April 15, 1996.176 By law,
Herdrich had thirty days from the final judgment date to file the
appeal. 177 Herdrich filed the appeal on January 6, 1997.178 The
defendants asserted that since she failed to file the appeal within the legal
time limit, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to
hear the appeal. 179
The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the final judgment was
not entered until December 5, 1996.180 It determined that the date of
dismissal for count III was merely "an interlocutory ruling, rather than a
final decision, [because] it failed to dispose of all the issues before the
court."1 8 1 Because Herdrich's count I and II were still being litigated,
the final judgment was not entered until the entire case was decided on
December 5, 1996.182 Therefore, the court concluded that Herdrich
filed her appeal in a timely fashion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
decided that it did have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 183
2. The ERISA Issue
Next, the defendants asserted that Herdrich failed to state a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.184 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the defendants' claim. 185 The
court stated that there are three factors that must be met in order to
174. Id. at 237.
175. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1998).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 368.
179. Id. at 367.
180. Id. at 368.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 380.
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properly state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.186 The facts must
allege all three elements. 187 First, that the defendants are plan fiduci-
aries. 188 Second, that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties. 189
Third, that there was a cognizable loss that resulted from the breach. 190
The court said that the Herdrich's pleadings had met all three
elements. 191
a. Fiduciary Duty
The court stated that when Congress enacted ERISA, it intended for
the definition of "fiduciary" to be broadly interpreted. 192 It referred to
the ERISA definition of "fiduciary," which provides:
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any ...discretionary control respecting management
of such plan or exercises any authority of control respecting
management or disposition of its assets ... or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.193
The court explained that any person who exercises any decision-
making authority over the plan's assets has the role of a fiduciary.19 4
The fiduciary need not be named as such in the plan itself.195 That
person's conduct alone can impose fiduciary obligations.196 The court
found that the expressed intent of Congress is to hold anyone with
discretionary authority over the plan's management as a fiduciary and
liable to beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty. 19 7
The court specifically cited two cases, Chicago Board Options
Exchange, Inc. v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. 198 and Harris
Trust & Savings Bank v. Provident Life .& Accident Insurance Co.199 in
which the Seventh Circuit broadly interpreted "fiduciary." 200 The first
186. Id. at 369.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. (stating statutory requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994)).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 370.
193. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994),
construed in Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1998).
194. Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 370.
195. Id. at 371.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 713 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1983).
199. 57 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1995).
200. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 370 (7th Cir. 1998).
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case involved, among other issues, whether an insurance company is a
fiduciary under ERISA when it manages and controls annuity accounts
for the plaintiff's retirement funds.201 The insurance company had
amended the annuity contract and changed the structure of the annuity
plan.202 It included an exculpatory clause that relieved the insurance
company of liability. 203 The court refused to allow the insurance
company to evade fiduciary status through the exculpatory clause.204
The court broadly defined "fiduciary" under ERISA.205 It held
that the insurance company's ability to amend the annuity contract
carried with it the status of an ERISA fiduciary. 206 When the insurance
company amended the annuity and locked the plaintiffs assets into one
fund for ten years, it effectively determined what type of investment the
plan must make. 207 Therefore, it exercised fiduciary responsibility over
the plan. 208 The insurance company's power to control the assets of the
annuity plan bears with it a fiduciary duty under ERISA.209
The second case the court discussed, Harris Trust & Savings Bank v.
Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., involved an employee's
daughter who was denied health insurance coverage when her father's
employer was acquired by another company. 210 A new health insurance
plan was created, which was funded by the company and administered
by a separate entity. 211 Since the separate entity was merely acting as an
administrator for the company who funded the insurance plan, the court
determined that the company, not the separate entity, retained control
over the claims procedures and practices. 212 The company was estab-
lished as a fiduciary under ERISA by virtue of its power over the claims
practices. 213 Thus, the actions of the company created the fiduciary role
of the company. 214
In the Herdrich case, the Seventh Circuit determined that Herdrich
rightly identified the defendants as fiduciaries. 215 The court reasoned
201. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 713 F.2d at 255.
202. Id. at 256.
203. Id. at 259.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 260.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id
209. Id. at 259.
210. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 608, 610-11 (7th
Cir. 1995).
211. Id. at 612.
212. Id. at 613.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 370 (7th Cir. 1998).
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that the fiduciary status was established when the defendants retained the
"control of each and every aspect of the HMO's governance, including
their own year-end bonuses." 216 Similar to Harris Trust, "the defen-
dants had the exclusive right to decide all disputed and non-routine
claims." 2 17 This discretionary control of deciding claims created the
fiduciary status of the defendants.218 The court emphasized that the plan
agreement did not need to name the defendants. 2 19 The defendants
created the fiduciary status through their own actions. 220 Thus, the court
agreed with Herdrich that the defendants were fiduciaries under
ERISA.221
b. The Breach of Fiduciary Duty
After determining that the Herdrich defendants were fiduciaries, the
court addressed the issue of breach of fiduciary duty.222 The court cited
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) which provides the standards for a fiduciary
under ERISA.223 According to those standards, a fiduciary must act in
his or her capacity as fiduciary for the sole purpose of promoting the
interest of the beneficiaries. 224 The fiduciary must act "with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims." 225 Therefore, any act that promotes the fiduciary's
interest is a breach of the fiduciary's duty.226
Although the fiduciary makes decisions without consulting with the
beneficiary, those decisions must be made by the fiduciary with "[a
single eye] to the interests of the [plan] participants and bene-
ficiaries." 227 There is a duty imposed on the fiduciary not to place
himself or herself in a position where his or her acts will compromise the
loyalty owed to plan participants. 228 Such compromising acts include
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 370-71.
220. Id. at 371.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1004(a)(1) (1994), construed in
Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 371 (7th Cir. 1998).
226. Herdrich, 154F.3d at 371.
227. Id. (quoting Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982)).
228. Id.
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self-dealing or schemes that involve a conflict of interest. 229 A breach of
fiduciary duty occurs when the fiduciary acts to benefit his or her own
interests. 230
The court pointed to a number of cases that support the plaintiff's
allegations that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty. The first
case involved a fiduciary who gained income from the decisions that it
made for the plan participants. 231 While a brokerage firm acted in the
capacity of a fiduciary, it breached its duty as a fiduciary when it per-
formed excessive securities trading on behalf of the plan and collected
commissions on those trades. 232 Another case involved a breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA when the fiduciary failed to provide
complete information about terms of reimbursement under a pension
plan to the beneficiaries, causing the beneficiaries to be misled.233
But more on point was a case from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Shea v. Esensten,234 which held that a
physician owed his patient a fiduciary duty. 235 The case involved Patrick
Shea, a patient who was hospitalized for severe chest pains during a busi-
ness trip.2 3 6 Subsequently, Shea visited his family doctor several times
for health care. 237 He discussed his family's extensive history of heart
disease. 238 He also discussed his symptoms of chest pains, shortness of
breath, muscle tingling, and dizziness. 239 In spite of these symptoms,
Shea's physician refused to refer Shea to a cardiologist for care. 240
Instead, the physician told Shea that his symptoms did not warrant
specialized care. 241 The physician also pointed out that at the age of
forty years old, Shea was much too young to need the care of a cardiolo-
gist. 242 However, Shea's symptoms did not improve. 243 He volunteered
to pay for the specialized care himself, but the physician continued to
refuse to refer Shea to a cardiologist. 244 A few months later, Shea died
of heart failure. 245
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Dasler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 694 F. Supp. 624,632 (D. Minn. 1988).
232. Id.
233. Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 1993).
234. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997)
235. Shea, 107 F.3d at 629.
236. Id. at 626.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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Shea had been an employee of Seagate Technologies (Seagate). 246
Seagate contracted with Medica, an HMO to provide health care benefits
to its employees. 247 Medica had a policy that prohibited care by a health
care specialist without a written referral from the primary care physi-
cian.248 However, Shea was not aware of Medica's incentive to minimize
referrals to specialists by withholding financial reimbursements to
primary care physicians by docking a portion of the physicians' fees if
they made too many referrals. 249 "According to Mr. Shea's widow
Dianne, if her husband had known his doctor could earn a bonus for
treating less, he would have disregarded his doctor's advice, sought a
cardiologist's opinion at his own expense, and would still be alive
today." 2 5 0
The Eighth Circuit Court in Shea v. Esensten determined that the
"duty of loyalty requires an ERISA fiduciary to communicate any ma-
terial facts which could adversely affect a plan member's interests." 251
The court noted that the common law of trusts defined the fiduciary's
duty long before Congress enacted ERISA: "The duty to disclose
material information is the core of a fiduciary's responsibility.... From
the patient's point of view, a financial incentive scheme put in place to
influence a treating doctor's referral practices when the patient needs
specialized care is certainly a material piece of information." 252
The court specifically pointed out that when a patient relies on
information from a treating physician, the patient should be informed
of the influence on the physician of a financial incentive not to
treat.253 "[T]he patient must know whether the advice is influenced by
self-serving financial considerations created by the health insurance
provider." 254
In Shea v. Esensten, Seagate's employees were not aware, and had
no occasion to know, that the physicians employed through the HMO's
contract had financial incentives to refuse to refer patients to special-
ists.255 The employees were not sufficiently instructed as to the physi-
cian's financial incentives. 256 Therefore, the employees trusted that the
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 627.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 628.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 629.
256. Id.
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physicians made decisions with the best interest of the employees in
mind. 257
The Eighth Circuit Court concluded that "[w]hen an HMO's
financial incentives discourage a treating doctor from providing essential
health care referrals for conditions covered under the plan benefit struc-
ture, the incentives must be disclosed and the failure to do so is a breach
of ERISA's fiduciary duties." 258 Thus, any failure to disclose to the
plan participants secret incentives that financially reward physicians who
minimize their use of tests and referrals is a breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA.259
Another case that the Herdrich court cited came from the Northern
District of Illinois. 260 Ries v. Humana Health Plan, Inc.261 involved an
HMO reimbursement plan in which the HMO was supposed to pay
eighty percent of the health care costs and plan participants were
supposed to pay the remaining twenty percent. 262 In fact, the HMO had
secretly set up substantial discounts for itself from the participating
health care providers. 263 Therefore, the HMO did not pay the full eighty
percent, but substantially less than eighty percent.264 Consequently, the
plan participants did not pay twenty percent, but substantially more than
twenty percent of the costs. 265
The district court decided that the "fiduciary's covert profiteering
at the expense of insureds is inconsistent with its duties of acting 'solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.' 266 It held that
ERISA did not permit the HMO to take the profits from the discounts
solely for its own benefit. 267 The HMO breached its fiduciary duty to
the plan participants when it secretly arranged for discounts that were
only intended to benefit the HMO.268 The plan participants were denied
the financial profits that the discounts offered. 269 Therefore, the HMO
did not act in the sole interest of the beneficiaries. 270
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 372 (7th Cir. 1998).
260. Ries v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., No. 94 C 6180, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16592 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 8, 1995).
261. No. 94 C 6180, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16592 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 1995).
262. Ries, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16592, at *7.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at *21 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(A) (1994)).
267. Id. at *21-*22.
268. Id.
269. Id. at *21.
270. Id.
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The Herdrich court drew similarities between the above cases and
the Herdrich case. In particular, the financial incentives that provided
the physicians with year-end bonuses were parallel to the financial
incentives in those cases. 271 The physicians' bonuses were calculated
according to the amount of cost-savings that the physicians engaged in,
meaning that the physicians' bonuses were based on the difference
between what the plan paid out in costs to provide medical services and
the payments to the plan by plan beneficiaries. 272 Thus, there was an
incentive for the physicians to decrease costs in order to increase their
year-end bonuses.
Since the costs to the plan involved the physician's authority to
provide or deny medical care, the physician's treatment decisions had a
direct impact on his or her year-end bonus.273 "With a jaundiced eye
focused firmly on year-end bonuses, it is not unrealistic to assume that
the doctors rendering care under the Plan were swayed to be most frugal
when exercising their discretionary authority to the detriment of their
membership." 274 Therefore, the physicians' roles as HMO admini-
strators directly conflicted with the power the physicians had to provide
discretionary medical treatment. 275
As was previously discussed,276 fiduciaries must act solely for the
interest of the beneficiaries. If fiduciaries act in their own interest, it is a
breach of the fiduciaries' duty. 2 7 7 The conflict between the physician's
power to provide medical care and the financial incentives to deny
medical care puts the physician in a position to breach his or her duty to
act in the sole interest of the beneficiaries. 278 However, the Herdrich
court reasoned that the mere existence of the conflict does not create a
breach. 279 The incentives must do more than just create a conflict; they
must actually cause the physician to act in his or her own interest.280
The court held that "incentives can rise to [a] level of ... breach where
... the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no
longer exists (i.e., where [the] physicians delay providing necessary
treatment to or withhold administering proper care to, plan beneficiaries
for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses)." 281
271. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 372 (7th Cir. 1998).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a.
277. See discussion supra notes 223-70 and accompanying text.
278. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 372 (7th Cir. 1998).
279. Id. at 373.
280. Id. at 372.
281. Id. at 373.
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The court decided that Herdrich did plead sufficient facts to support
her allegation of the defendants' breach of fiduciary duty. 282 The court
stated that the trial judge erred in the dismissal of count 111.283 The
Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court's dismissal of the Herdrich's
amended count III against the defendants for breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA.284
D. THE DIssENT OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
1. Dual Loyalties of Fiduciaries
The dissent agreed with the majority's opinion that "an incentive
existed for the defendants to limit treatment and, in turn, HMO costs so
as to ensure larger bonuses." 285 However, the dissent did not agree that
a mere existence of the conflict (created by the financial incentives not
to treat), without more, gave rise to a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA.286 The dissent stated that Herdrich only
pointed to the existence of the HMO's structural incentives for the
physician not to treat.287 The dissent argued that merely pointing out
the existence of the incentive to deny care at the point of delivery of care
and at the point of coverage does not constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty.2 88
The dissent determined that ERISA allows for some conflict of
interest of fiduciaries. 289 "Most notably, section 408(c)(3) of ERISA
permits an employer or other plan sponsor to have its own 'officer,
employee, agent, or other representative' serve as trustee or other fiduci-
ary." 290 When the plan sponsor is allowed to appoint its own agent as a
fiduciary, the sponsor retains some confidence that the sponsor's funds
will be wisely utilized. 29 1 Thus, more employers and sponsors are
encouraged to establish benefits plans. 292 The dissent ascertained that
ERISA does not bar dual loyalties of fiduciaries. 293
282. Id. at 380.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 380-81.
285. Id. at 381 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1994)).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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2. Market Forces
The dissent surmised that market forces result in a reduced risk that
the decisions made by the fiduciary will work to the detriment of the
plan and the plan beneficiaries. 294 The dissent relied on the rationale
that market forces induce the fiduciary to make decisions that favor the
plan and its beneficiaries. 295 If benefits were continually denied, over
time, the current customers would lose loyalty in the insurance company
and potential new customers would be less likely to engage the insurance
company for coverage. 296 Therefore, the dissent reasoned, it is contrary
to prudent business management for the fiduciary to engage in decision
making that does not serve the interest of the plan beneficiaries. 297
According to this reasoning, the fiduciaries' conflict of interest
influences the fiduciaries to find in favor of the beneficiaries' claims
when making decisions whether or not to deny claims. 298 In fact, the
dissent maintains that "no conflict of interest exists because paying
meritorious claims is in the insurer's best interest." 299 The fiduciary
works for a company that is paid by the sponsor of the plan. 300 The
companies that sponsor the plan "are customers who choose which
group insurance policies they will use to fund their plans. . . . These
employers want to see their employees' claims granted because they
want their employees satisfied with their fringe benefits." 301 The dissent
reasoned that if the claims are consistently denied, the employees will be
unhappy and the sponsors will take their business elsewhere in order to
satisfy their employees. 302
a. Mers v. Marriott
For the market forces theory, the dissent relied on Mers v.
Marriott.303 In Mers, the plaintiffs husband suffered a fatal heart attack
while he was traveling on business for Marriott International, Inc.
(Marriott) as a volunteer to rehabilitate a house for Habitat for
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 382.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. (quoting Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144
F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir. 1998)).
302. Id.
303. 144 F.3d 1014, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 1998).
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Humanity.304 Marriott had an employee benefit plan that paid $100,000
for the loss of life, eyesight, speech, hearing, or limbs if the employee
suffered the loss as a result of an accident. 305 Unbeknownst to his wife,
Mers had paid for an additional, optional $100,000 benefit plan. 3 06 The
total final claim was for $200,000.307
Marriott's Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan, insured by
American International Group (AIG), refused to distribute plan benefits
to the widow of Mers because it determined through its subsidiary
American International Company (AIC) that an accident did not cause
the death of Mr. Mers. 308 Instead, the company concluded that an
underlying disease state, of which Mr. Mers had no previous symptoms,
was the cause of the heart attack.309
The widow of Mers sued the Marriott International Group
Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan. 310 She stated that Marriott
wrongfully denied her claim for benefits and alleged that there was an
"inherent conflict of interest . . . when a company sponsored plan
[allowed the] insurance company to interpret its own policies." 311 Mrs.
Mers asserted that "since an insurance company pays benefit claims out
of its own assets, 'its fiduciary role lies in perpetual conflict with its
profit-making role as a business."' 312
The court found no inherent conflict of interest. 3 13 The reasoning
the court gave was that "[tihe impact of granting or denying benefits in
this case is minuscule compared to AIG's bottom line." 314 AIG, the
insurer, was consistently named one of the fifty largest companies in the
Fortune 500 listing.315 The claim of $200,000 would be minuscule
compared to the assets that the company controlled. 3 16 If AIG denied
meritorious claims, the sponsors of the plans (AIG's customers) would
search elsewhere for insurance carriers that would service their
employees satisfactorily. 317 Therefore, the court decided, "no conflict
304. Mers, 44 F.3d at 1017.
305. Id. at 1018.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1018.
308. Id. at 1018-19.
309. Id. at 1018.
310. Id. at 1019.
311. Id. at 1020-21.
312. Id (quoting Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (1 1th Cir. 1990)).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1021.
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of interest exists because paying meritorious claims is in AIG's best
interest." 318
b. Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Company
Another case that the dissent in Herdrich relied on was Chalmers v.
Quaker Oats Co.319 In Chalmers, an employee sued his former employ-
er, Quaker Oats Company, for conflict of interest and bias when the
employee was fired from his job as vice president of the company. 320
The employer denied the employee severance benefits because the
employee was discharged for violating the company's policy against
sexual harassment. 321
The employee challenged the decision that was made by the Quaker
Oats Officers' Severance Program Committee (Committee). He asserted
that the Committee's decision was biased because the Committee
members were officers of Quaker Oats Company. 322 The employee also
alleged that the severance program was funded by the earnings of
Quaker Oats, thereby directly impacting the salaries of the Committee
members and creating a conflict of interest. 323
The court held that the Committee's decision was not biased. 324
The reasoning the court gave was that Quaker Oats has an incentive to
grant severance benefits. 325 If it did not uphold its benefits packages,
current employees would lose faith in the company and seek employ-
ment elsewhere. Potential employees would be reluctant to seek employ-
ment at Quaker Oats. 326 The court reasoned that it was in the best
interest of the company to pay severance benefits. 327
E. ANALYSIS OF THE DISSENT'S OPINION
Under the dissent's logic, fiduciaries should approve all meritorious
claims. If they do not, logic follows that the welfare of the company and
their jobs could be in jeopardy. The dissent fails to consider that if all
meritorious claims are approved, the insurance company may dispense
318. Id.
319. 61 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 381 (7th Cir. 1998)
(discussing Chalmers).
320. Chalmers, 61 F.3d at 1344.
321. Id. at 1343.
322. Id. at 1344.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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hefty payments in claims that could exceed the amount of the premiums.
This puts the insurance company into more financial peril than denying
claims. The dissent's market forces theory is contrary to the profit-
making incentives that drive the insurance company to be in business.
Furthermore, the dissent's market force theory is not applicable to
the Herdrich case. 328 Certainly, Herdrich's claim was meritorious: she
suffered abdominal pain for several weeks prior to her appendix rup-
turing.329 Pegram acknowledged that Herdrich had an inflamed mass in
her abdomen. 330 Yet, Pegram insisted that Herdrich wait to use the facili-
ties owned by Carle, the HMO.331 According to the dissent's market
forces theory, Pegram should have approved Herdrich's treatment at a
non-Carle facility.332 The market forces would have caused Pegram to
be concerned that Herdrich and her husband would become dissatisfied
with her treatment. 333 Herdrich and her husband would, in turn, report
their discontent to the husband's employer. This puts pressure on the
employer to engage a competitor HMO for services. Clearly, there were
different "forces" placed on the physician other than the dissent's
theory of market forces. 334
The fiduciary in Herdrich is distinguishable from the fiduciary in
the Mers and Chalmers cases. The fiduciary in Mers v. Marriott is a
Fortune 500 company that would barely feel the pinch of paying a
$200,000 claim. 335 Therefore, the issue of paying the claim is irrelevant
to the company's well-being. 336 Marriott's decision of whether to pay
the claim has a minimal effect on the overall profits of the company. 337
In fact, the company's reputation is more at stake than its financial
welfare. 338 The fiduciary makes his or her decision based on the best
interests of the customers in order to maintain a relationship with the
customers and with hopes of upholding his or her reputation in order
to gain new customers. Unlike in Herdrich, there was no financial
incentive for the fiduciary in Mers to deny claims. 339
The fiduciaries in the Chalmers case represent a "corporation which
generates revenues of nearly $6 billion annually and is therefore not
328. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 374 (7th Cir. 1998).
329. Id. at 365 n.l.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 374.
333. Id. at 381.
334. Id. at 374.
335. Mers v. Marriott, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998).
336. Id. at 1021.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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likely to flinch at paying out [a] $240,000 [severance benefit]." 340 Fol-
lowing the same logic as Mers, the company's interest in maintaining its
benefits packages and upholding its reputation outweighs the detrimental
impact of denying meritorious claims.341 Thus, the decision to deny
severance benefits in Chalmers is not biased because the company's
overall income was only minimally affected by the loss in profits. 342
The fiduciaries in the Herdrich case are not a Fortune 500 com-
pany, nor do the company's revenues list in the billions of dollars. 34 3
The fiduciaries in Herdrich do not have the large pool of funds that were
available to the fiduciaries in Mers and Chalmers.344 HAMP, one of the
fiduciaries in the Herdrich case, held assets of less than $14 million. 345
Pegram is not only the physician who treated Herdrich, she is also part
owner and administrator of the HMO.346
"The Plan dictated that the very same HMO administrators vested
with the authority to determine whether health care claims would be paid,
and the type, nature, and duration of care to be given, were those
physicians who became eligible to receive year-end bonuses. . . ."347
Therefore, Pegram's discretionary decision to withhold treatment would
increase her year-end bonus. Unlike the fiduciaries in the Mers and
Chalmers cases, Pegram's financial well being was directly impacted by
her decision not to treat Herdrich.348 The fiduciaries' decisions in the
Mers and Chalmers cases, as the dissent acknowledged, did not impact
the fiduciaries' financial gains. 349
As the majority opinion in Herdrich states, "Chalmers and its ilk are
distinguishable from the facts [in Herdrich] because, whereas the
members of the Quaker severance committee were all officers of Quaker,
not one of the officers was an 'owner' of, or had a direct financial
interest in, the Quaker Oats Company, as was the case [in Herdrich]."350
340. Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 379 (7th Cir. 1998).
344. Id. at 378-79.
345. Id. at 379.
346. Id. at 373. Herdrich's amended count III states that:
a. [the] CARLE owners/physicians are the officers and directors of HAMP and
CHIMCO and receive a year-end distribution, based [on] payments made to CARLE by
HAMP and CHIMCO; [and] b. [both HAMP and CHIMCO are directed and controlled
by CARLE owner/physicians and seek to fund their ... medical expense payments to
CARLE [through minimizing care and determining the level of treatment].
Id.
347. Id. at 372.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 379.
350. Id.
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Therefore, the financial incentives of the fiduciaries in Herdrich and the
financial incentives in the Mers and Chalmers cases cannot be compared.
The "authority of [the] physician/owners of Carle to simultaneously
control the care of their patients and reap the profits generated by the
HMO through the limited use of tests and referrals" 351 is not the same as
the authority of the fiduciary who represents a company with revenues in
the billions of dollars to deny claims that have only a minimal financial
impact on the company. 352 The reliance of the dissent on these two
cases is misplaced. 353
The dissent recognizes that the "imposition of incentives to limit
care could support a claim of breach of fiduciary duty when there is a
serious flaw in the manner in which the incentive arrangement is
established or a significant limitation on the ability of plan sponsors to
obtain alternative arrangements in the market." 354 An example of this
would be "a breakdown in the market or in the negotiating process that
led to the imposition of incentives." 355 The dissent acknowledges that
an imbalance of bargaining power can establish a breach of fiduciary
duty.356
Although the plaintiffs complaint did not allege that Carle had the
more powerful position in negotiating its contract with Dr. Pegram, it is
well-documented, not only in the medical community but also in the
popular press, that HMOs negotiate heavy handedly with physicians for
contracts. 357 In fact, financial incentives to restrain costs are the driving
forces that keep most HMOs in business. 358 No matter what the financial
structure of the HMO is, "[iun all cases, HMOs are well positioned to ob-
tain providers' services on competitive terms and to insist on cooperation
in their cost-containment efforts." 359 There are 152 million Americans
who receive insurance through their employers. 360 Eighty-six percent of
these employees are enrolled in some form of managed care. 361 HMOs
351. Id. at 373.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 374
354. Id. at 384 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See generally, Ellyn E. Spragins, Take My Freedom, Please NEWSWEEK, April 7, 1997, at
81. The author reveals "the secret truth about an HMO: its sole mission is to make doctors practice
medicine the way it wants." Id. See also Doctors Band Together to Bargain; Introduction of Bill that
Would Permit Physicians to Engage in Collective Bargaining Agreements, BustNEss & HEALTH, May 1,
1999, at 10. The article discusses the frustration of doctors in response to "managed care's
heavy-handed tactics to get them to sign contracts." Id.
358. HAVIGHuRsT E-r AL., supra note 4, at 206.
359. Id.
360. Brink, supra note 41, at 72.
361. Id.
296 [VOL. 77:267
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO LIMIT HEALTH CARE
serve a significant portion of the population, thus controlling the market
leverage to collaborate and dominate the health care industry on their
own terms. 362 The bottom line is that HMOs are big business.
Therefore, the competition in the marketplace did not put Carle in a
position to have much freedom to negotiate the terms of the plan. The
establishment and survival of Carle's HMO required cost-cutting mea-
sures that kept the business competitive. 363 In order to maintain profits
for the owners of Carle (that is, the physicians), the plan contained fiman-
cial incentives to deny care.364 These are the same types of incentives
that are offered within other managed care plans.365 Since HMOs serve a
significant portion of the American population, it is ordinary practice to
compel the physician to sign contracts with HMOs that contain the same
type of incentives. 366
Many physicians are forced into signing contracts with HMOs in
order to obtain new patients or retain current patients. 367 Some physi-
cians feel as though they are being held hostage by the financial
arrangements controlled by the managed care plans. 36 8 "In some areas,
particularly California and other states where managed care is common-
place, many medical groups are struggling financially. Several large
groups have filed for bankruptcy, blaming their struggles on low pay-
ments from insurers." 369 They must sacrifice personal financial interest
in order to remain in the medical profession. 370
Currently, there is a backlash from physicians against HMOs.371
"Managed care spent nearly a decade holding down health spending by
squeezing doctors, hospitals and clinics. Now doctors and hospitals are
saying it's time to squeeze insurers." 372 A Harris Interactive/Harvard
poll of 348 doctors in 1999 found that eighty-three percent of them are
362. Id.
363. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 379 (7th Cir. 1998). The Herdrich court explained that
Carle physicians received year-end bonuses only if "the annual expenditure made by physicians on
benefits was less than total plan receipts." Id.
364. Id.
365. Latham, supra note 12, at 403-05.
366. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 4, at 1194-95. The use of incentive plans to underserve
patients is recommended by professional organizations as a means to reduce high medical costs. Id.
367. Laurie Dibattista, Doctors Running Out of Patience (Career Changes Among Colorado
Physicians), DENV. Bus. J., Feb. 13, 1998, at 3B.
368. Id. "For doctors, the healthcare industry's swing to managed-care medicine has meant 'a
loss of control to make decisions along with a decrease in income.... A number are probably retiring
earlier because of frustration with the system."' Id. (quoting Dr. Ray Painter, former president of The
Colorado Medical Society).
369. Julie Appleby, Frustrated Doctors Rebel Against Insurers, USA TODAY, July 20, 2000, at 1 b.
370. Dibattista, supra note 367. "With the changing healthcare scene, many doctors have seen a
decline in their earnings." Id.
371. Appleby, supra note 369.
372. Id.
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unhappy with the health care system, up from sixty-seven percent in
1997.373 Many doctors are beginning to realize the clout that their
profession has, and they are banding together against managed care
insurers. 374 In Houston, 1,000 doctors gave their notice that they would
quit the Humana plan which covered the treatment of their patients. 375 A
restraining order kept the doctors from breaking their contract.376 In
Connecticut, a 300-member physicians' group gave Aetna notice that it
would not renew its contract. 377 The president of that group says the
physicians want Aetna to deliver on what it has promised and to stop
unfair denials of payments.378 Physicians are beginning to influence
managed care in a way that the court system could not.379
Many patients are forced, either through the benefit options offered
by their employers or by financial constraints, to enroll in managed care
programs. 380 Employees often have little or no choice in selecting their
health plans. 381 Generally, the employer decides which health plans to
contract with and then the employee chooses which option suits his or
her situation best (for example, a family plan, individual plan, HMO,
PPO, or fee-for-service). 382  Sometimes, small companies do not offer
any options for health care plans or they may not offer any health care
plans at all.383
When options are offered, the employee's decision to enroll in one
plan over another plan typically hinges on the financial burden to the
employee. 384 If the employee is working at a low wage job, he or she
generally will enroll in the plan with the least cost, regardless of the
health care benefits it offers.385 Thus, many employees are given
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. See George Church, Backlash Against HMOs; Doctors, Patients, Unions, Legislators are
Fed Up and Say They Won't Take It Anymore, TIME, April 14, 1997, at 32 (discussing the power of
doctors when they band together to form physician organizations). "[T]he doctors potentially have
mighty muscle: without them, HMOs can't exist." Id.
380. See id. (explaining that employee union contracts often specify what medical insurance is to
be provided for members).
381. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 4, at 9. "Most Americans obtain financial protection against
health care costs through the employer of a family member .... [E]mployees are offered a choice of
plans, with benefits either prescribed by the employer or specified by the individual plans." Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. "Other employers, mostly smaller ones, simply assist their employees in purchasing
group coverage provided by insurance companies or by organized health plans, such as health
maintenance organizations." Id.
384. See id. at 168 (discussing that health care costs are rising faster than other components of
the cost of living); see also Russell Watson, Focus; HMO Hell: The Backlash, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8,
1999, at 62 (indicating that the cost of health care insurance premiums rose 4.8% in 1999).
385. Id. at 9-10.
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options that are impossible for them to take because the options are
simply too expensive.386 After all, most people are employed to receive
a paycheck, not to decrease their earnings in exchange for health care. 387
In some ways, the Herdrich dissent is right when suggesting that
market forces shape the choices in health care. 388 However, those forces
are led by an industry dominated by managed care's financial incentives
to deny health care and by limited employee options to obtain health
care plans that are not administered through managed care. 389 It clearly
demonstrates that an imbalance in bargaining power exists between
managed care organizations and the beneficiaries they serve. 390 One
could argue that there is a significant limitation on the ability of plan
sponsors to obtain alternative arrangements in the market. Therefore, a
breakdown in the market led to the imposition of financial incentives in
the Herdrich case and a breach of fiduciary duty does exist.
IV. PEGRAM V. HERDRICH: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
After the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
decided in favor of Herdrich that she had sufficiently alleged a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States. 391 The case was argued on February 23, 2000 and
on June 12, 2000,392 the Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision. 393
The Court recognized the HMO physician's incentive to provide
less care, not more. 394 "[I]nducement to ration care is the very point of
any HMO scheme, and rationing necessarily raises some risks while
reducing others." 395 The Court said that the decision of the Pegram
case is assumed to apply to all HMOs acting through their physicians as
fiduciaries. 396 Therefore, the decision is pertinent to all HMOs with
similar issues and not specific to the Pegram case.
386. Id
387. Id.
388. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 381 (7th Cir. 1998) (Flaum, J., dissenting).
389. See discussion supra notes 359-84 and accompanying text.
390. Id.
391. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,217-18 (2000).
392. Id. at 211.
393. Id. at 218.
394. Id. at 236.
395. Id. at 221.
396. Id.
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A. RESPONSIBILITIES OF FIDUCIARIES UNDER ERISA
The Court stated the general terms of fiduciary responsibility under
ERISA: "[F]iduciaries shall discharge their duties with respect to a plan
'solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries' . . . that is
'for the exclusive purpose of (i) providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of admini-
stering the plan."' 39 7 The source of the responsibilities imposed by
ERISA on fiduciaries is the common law of trusts.39 8 The Court empha-
sized that a fiduciary under the common law of trusts generally wears
only one hat.3 99 Therefore, the decision of the fiduciary is typically
made with only an eye toward the beneficiaries' interests. 400
A fiduciary under ERISA may wear two hats.40 1 For example, the
fiduciary may be an employer and also an administrator of plan bene-
fits. 402 Therefore, an ERISA fiduciary may have financial interests ad-
verse to the beneficiaries' interests.4 0 3 However, the Court made it clear
that the fiduciary under ERISA may only wear one hat at a time.40 4
"ERISA does require ... that the fiduciary with two hats wear only one
at a time, and wear the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary deci-
sions." 4 05 The Court surmised that the analysis of the issue should be-
gin by asking whether the fiduciary was acting in a fiduciary capacity
when making the decision in question.4O6
The essence of Herdrich's claim was an anticipatory breach of
fiduciary duty.4 07 "[W]hen State Farm contracted with Carle, Carle be-
came a fiduciary under the plan, acting through its physicians." 40 8
Since Carle and its physicians benefitted from the year-end bonus
scheme, its capacity as fiduciary was compromised. 40 9 Carle's willing-
ness to participate in the plan and receive bonus money for denying
benefits was an anticipatory breach of its fiduciary duty.4 10
397. Id. at 223-24.
398. Id. at 224.
399. Id. at 224-25.
400. Id. at 223.
401. Id. at 225.
402. Id. at 225-26.
403. Id. at 225.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 226.
407. Id. at 227.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
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B. ELIGIBILITY DECISIONS VERSUS TREATMENT DECISIONS
The Court distinguished two different types of decisions that fiduci-
aries of a plan make. 4 11 The first type of decision is an "eligibility"
decision. With this type of decision, the fiduciary determines whether
the plan covers a particular condition or medical procedure. 4 12 The
fiduciary ascertains whether the plan provides payment for the medical
care that the beneficiary requires. 4 13
The second type of decision is the "treatment" decision. When
making a treatment decision, the fiduciary chooses "how to go about
diagnosing and treating a patient's condition." 414 The decision is made
by the fiduciary (physician) about what type of medical care the patient
requires.415
These two types of decisions are intertwined. 416 The fiduciary mak-
ing these decisions is the treating physician. 4 17 He or she must decide
whether the medical condition warrants the treatment options offered by
the plan. 418 In other words, do the patient's signs and symptoms justify
approval of the medical management that the plan allows? 419
Dr. Pegram's decision not to treat Herdrich was a mixed eligibility
and treatment decision. 420 Pegram denied Herdrich the very procedure,
an ultrasound, that would have definitively determined whether
Herdrich's condition was an emergency. 42 1 Pegram determined that
Herdrich's suffering abdominal pain for two weeks did not warrant an
emergency ultrasound. Pegram made a discretionary decision.4 22 The
decision was subjectively based on the physical exam of Herdrich, not
objectively based on medical diagnostic testing.423
In making the subjective discretionary decision, Pegram undoubt-
edly took into account many different factors. One element of her
411. Id. at 228.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 228-29.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 229-30.
421. Id. at 215.
422. See Orentlicher, supra note 27, at 191. "If the plan requires primary care physicians to
authorize care, the primary care physicians will have to rely largely on their own judgment to decide
whether care is covered by the plan." Id.
423. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 215 (2000). The facts demonstrate that the decision to
treat Herdrich's complaints of abdominal pain was based on only the physical examination of
Herdrich, not on any objective testing. Id.
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decision is whether the diagnostic test would be paid for by the plan.4 24
If it were not covered, who would foot the bill? Moreover, if the
ultrasound was given and it determined that the condition was not an
emergency, would Pegram's year-end bonus be affected? All of these
issues must have been considered because, as the Court points out, the
decisions of eligibility and treatment are intertwined. 425
C. THE INTENT OF CONGRESS
The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend any "HMO to be
treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes mixed eligibility deci-
sions acting through its physicians." 426 The Court pointed to the com-
mon law of trusts in which ERISA is based: "At common law, fiduciary
duties characteristically attach to decisions about managing assets and
distributing property to beneficiaries." 427 A trustee typically makes
decisions to conserve and nurture assets of beneficiaries. 428 Generally,
these types of decisions involve payment of money. 429 The Court distin-
guished this type of duty from that of a physician acting in the interest
of the patient.430
"Traditional trustees administer a medical trust by paying out
money to buy medical care, whereas physicians making mixed eligibility
decisions consume the money as well." 431 The Court explained that,
historically, trustees do not make treatment decisions about benefici-
aries. 432 Generally, the decisions of trustees involve the distribution of
funds.433 Since Congress enacted ERISA to protect pension plan pay-
ments to retirees, the Court inferred that it was doubtful that Congress
intended the fiduciary duty under ERISA to apply to physicians who
make mixed decisions about eligibility and treatment.4 34
424. Id. at 219. The Court explained that an HMO "physician's financial interest lies in provid-
ing less care, not more." Id. Therefore, it is in the physician's best interest to consider the financial
implications of a treatment decision. Id. at 220.
425. Id. at 228.
426. Id. at 231.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 231-32.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 231.
433. Id. at 231-32.
434. Id. at 232.
302 [VOL. 77:267
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO LIMIT HEALTH CARE
D. THE IMPACT ON THE FOR-PROFIT HMOs
The Court stated that if Herdrich's claim were recognized, it would
summon the downfall of all for-profit HMOs.435 The Court determined
that Congress promoted the formation of HMOs by passing the HMO
Act more than twenty-seven years ago. 436 The Court reasoned that if
Herdrich's claim were allowed to move forward, it would defy the
intent of Congress. 437 Therefore, the federal judiciary would be acting
contrary to congressional intent if it heard Herdrich's claim.43 8
The Court barred Herdrich's claim.4 39 It dismissed the action and
refused to allow an HMO to be sued for breach of fiduciary duty. 440 In
making the decision, the Court considered the overwhelming impact it
would have on the health care system. 441 It would be detrimental to the
existence of managed care by increasing litigation.442 With so much of
the American public depending on HMOs for health care benefits, the
court system could become inundated with claims. 443 The Court did not
undertake to begin the unraveling of the HMO health care system. 444
Instead, it maintained that if Congress intended for HMOs to be held
accountable for breach of fiduciary duty, then Congress, not the
judiciary, should act.445 Thus, the Supreme Court passed the torch of
responsibility to correct the detrimental financial incentives of denying
care to Congress. 446
E. FEDERAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM
The Court suggested "every claim of fiduciary breach by an HMO
physician making a mixed decision would boil down to a malpractice
claim, and the fiduciary standard would be nothing but the malpractice
standard traditionally applied in actions against physicians." 447 The
Court stated that the "defense of any HMO would be that its physician
435. Id. at 233. "Since the provision for profit is what makes the HMO a proprietary
organization, her remedy in effect would be nothing less than elimination of the for-profit HMO." Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 234.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 237.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 235-36.
443. Id. at 237.
444. Id. at 232-37.
445. Id. at 233-34. "If Congress wishes to restrict its approval of HMO practice to certain
preferred forms, it may choose to do so." Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 235.
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did not act out of financial interest but for good medical reasons." 448
The claim would come down to what the standards of reasonable and
customary medical practice called for under the circumstances. 449
Thus if Herdrich prevailed, the Court reasoned that a new federal
medical malpractice rule would be established. 450 Essentially, the same
medical malpractice claim could be brought in federal court as well as
state court.451 The Court maintained that there would not be any advan-
tage to allowing federal fiduciary malpractice claims.452 It would simply
provide more favorable scheduling or an opportunity to seek attorney's
fees. 4 53
F. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
1. Physician-Patient Relationship
When the physician receives a financial incentive to reduce patient
care, a conflict of interest exists between the physician and the patient.454
The physician, who is supposed to spend medical funds in the sole
interest of the beneficiary, also profits from not spending those same
funds.455 The physician has a superior role to determine how the medi-
cal funds should be spent.4 56 He or she has the discretion, based on
medical knowledge, to advise the patient as to what treatment options are
available. If more than one treatment is available, the patient trusts that
the physician will give advice, solely with the best interest of the patient
in mind, as to which treatment is best for the patient.457 The physician's
profits should not, but often are, considered by the physician when
making treatment decisions.458
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 235-36.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 237.
454. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 4, at 203-04. "Courts frequently distrust economizing
decisions by health plan personnel because they sense a conflict of interest." Id.
455. Id. at 209. For example, under one type of managed care incentive system, if the physi-
cian's capitation account shows a surplus, the physician receives thirty to fifty percent of the total
surplus. Id. If the account shows a deficit, the physician forfeits a portion of his or her capitation
payments, as much as twenty-five percent. Id. at 209-10. Technically, the physician pays when he or
she makes a specialty referral, admits a patient into a hospital, or refers the patient for ancillary
services. Id. at 210. "The economic incentives are clear: keep the patient away from consultants, out
of the hospital, and out of the office." Id.
456. Id.
457. Marsh, supra note 6, at 1333. "Trust is crucial to the physician-patient relationship....
[P]hysicians act as the exclusive source of expertise and help for sick, vulnerable patients." Id.
458. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 372 (7th Cir. 1998). "With a jaundiced eye focused
firmly on year-end bonuses, it is not unrealistic to assume that the doctors rendering care under the
304
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As long as courts do not revise ERISA's text, courts can rely on
federal common law to interpret ERISA fiduciary duty. 459 The common
law of trusts imposes broad disclosure requirements.4 60 Without a direct
inquiry, the common law does not require that a fiduciary disclose infor-
mation to the beneficiary. 461 But, "[t]he common law does recognize,
however, an affirmative duty when the trustee possesses superior knowl-
edge of certain information that the beneficiary needs to know to protect
her interests." 462 The Second Restatement of Trusts provides that the
trustee "is under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts
affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary
does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his
protection in dealing with a third person with respect to his interest."463
Certainly, most patients are not knowledgeable about the medical
procedures that the physician recommends. 464 Nor are most patients
knowledgeable about the payment scheme that controls the physician's
disclosure of those same medical procedures.465 Therefore, it would vio-
late the common law of trust if a fiduciary failed to disclose information
that could potentially be harmful to the beneficiary.4 66
2. The HMO Act and ERISA
We must consider the era of the health care system that existed at
the time when ERISA was enacted. In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA,467
just one year after the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 was
established.468 It is uncertain as to whether Congress could envision the
impact that the HMO Act would have on the health care system; 469 the
American people certainly could not.
Plan were swayed to be most frugal when exercising their discretionary authority to the detriment of
their membership." Id.
459. Ryan Steven Johnson, Note, ERISA Doctor in the House? The Duty to Disclose Physician
Incentives to Limit Health Care, 82 Mn, i. L. REV. 1631, 1644 (1998).
460. Id. at 1644-45.
461. Id. at 1645.
462. Id.
463. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op TRssS § 173 cmt. d (1959).
464. See Johnson, supra note 459, at 1651. "Patients generally trust and rely on their physicians'
advice about medical treatment options." Id.
465. Id. at 1655. "Studies indicate that the majority of MCO [managed care organization]
enrollees are not aware of the fact that their MCOs employ cost-containment mechanisms to influence
physician decisionmaking, mechanisms that introduce potential conflicts of interest into their
relationships with their physicians." Id.
466. Id. at 1651. "The common law of trusts intended affirmative disclosure of information....
The plan fiduciary knows that the beneficiary is not in possession of information needed to protect her
interests involving matters of life and death." Id.
467. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
468. 42 U.S.C. § 300e etseq. (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
469. Johnson, supra note 459, at 1654. "Reasonable legislators would not have intended to leave
plan beneficiaries in a worse situation than they would have been in ERISA's absence." Id.
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The early 1970s health care system was based on fee-for-service. 470
The physicians dictated what procedures were done, and insurance
companies paid for those procedures. 471 Patients trusted their physicians
to make health care decisions in the patients' best interests, even if it
meant more money in the physician's pocket. The HMO scheme of
health care delivery was not widely utilized.472 In fact, HMO enrollment
did not dominate the market until recently. 473 "Enrollment in HMOs
grew more than tenfold between 1970 and 1990, from 3.6 million to
more than 35 million beneficiaries." 474 In 1995, "twenty percent of
Americans [were] enrolled in HMOs."475
Congress enacted ERISA to protect pension funds of retirees in
response to "some highly publicized instances of fraud and mismanage-
ment of pension funds." 476  It was specifically designed to apply to
"'employee pension benefit plans' (which provide retirement income)
and 'employee welfare benefit plans' (which provide benefits for
incidents of illness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment)." 477
Since the HMO Act did not take full effect at the time, it is highly
unlikely that Congress ever envisioned ERISA to negatively impact
HMO beneficiaries.4 78 It is doubtful that Congress intended ERISA to
put HMO beneficiaries in a worse position than they would have been if
ERISA had not been made law. 479 ERISA was meant to protect benefici-
aries' interests, not create a shield to protect fiduciaries' interests. 480 In
enacting ERISA, Congress' intent was to guard against the very same
fraud and mismanagement in which Pegram engaged.4 81
470. Latham, supra note 12, at 400; Marsh, supra note 6, at 1327; McGraw, supra note 49, at
1822.
471. See Marsh, supra note 6, at 1327.
472. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 4, at 216. The authors note:
[T]he HMO Act did not do as much to assist the progress of HMOs as [one] might
[expect]. [M]any employers were reluctant to contract with nonqualified plans because
they anticipated being required, under the mandatory "dual-choice" provisions of the
federal act, also to offer a federally qualified plan once one became available.... The
most rapid growth of HMOs did not occur until the 1980s....
Id.
473. Id.
474. McGraw, supra note 49, at 1823.
475. Orentlicher, supra note 27, at 157.
476. HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 4, at 66.
477. Id.
478. See discussion supra notes 474-77 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra notes
479-81 and accompanying text.
479. Johnson, supra note 459, at 1654.
480. HAVIGHRST ET AL., supra note 4, at 67. "Congress did not conceive ERISA's regulatory
scheme with health benefits particularly in mind. Instead, it designed ERISA principally to govern the
establishment and administration of pension and welfare funds, setting uniform standards for
participation, funding, vesting, disclosure, and reporting and for the conduct of fiduciaries." Id. at 67.
481. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 380 (7th Cir. 1998).
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3. Congress Must Act
The Supreme Court decided that if Congress intended to restrict its
approval of HMO practices to only some selected arrangements, it
should amend ERISA to do so.482 In fact, Congress has moved in that
direction. Legislation has recently been passed that prohibits federally
funded HMOs from providing physicians financial incentives to limit
services that are deemed medically necessary.4 83 It also "require[s]
HMOs to disclose information concerning physician incentive plans
to any Medicare beneficiary," upon request from the beneficiary. 484
Congress recognized the need to protect beneficiaries from the financial
incentives that induce physicians to deny care. However, this enactment
only applies to federally funded Medicare and Medicaid HMO
beneficiaries. 485
But if Congress recognizes the need to protect federally funded
HMO beneficiaries, it is possible to say that Congress would not be
opposed to the Court protecting privately funded HMO beneficiaries
through a broad interpretation of ERISA. Although no specific provi-
sions for breach of fiduciary duty regarding privately funded HMOs
exist in the legislature, it may be implied through judicial interpreta-
tion.486 Despite this, the Court declined to interpret ERISA's fiduciary
duty in this way.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court used interesting logic to determine that HMOs
are not liable for breach of fiduciary duty through physicians'
decisions. The Court could have applied a broad interpretation of the
fiduciary duty under ERISA. 487 The HMOs could be held responsible
under this broad interpretation. However, to insulate the health care
system from a major collapse, the Court chose to protect HMOs under
the cloak of congressional intent. 488 The Court put the burden of
correcting the detrimental financial incentives placed on physicians by
482. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 233-34 (2000).
483. Johnson, supra note 459, at 1639 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 (2000)).
484. Id.
485. Marsh, supra note 6, at 1333-34.
486. Id. at 1337. "With proper judicial interpretation,. . . ERISA's broad definitions of fiduciary
and fiduciary duty can adequately effectuate Congressional intent in the context of managed care."
Id.
487. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 370-71 (7th Cir. 1998).
488. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,234-35 (2000).
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HMOs in the hands of the legislature. 48 9 Now, it is up to the legislature
to establish laws that limit financial incentives. 490 If change is not soon
forthcoming, the health care system will be subject to transformation
from within by both the physicians and the patients. It is time for
Congress to act to reform the HMO financial incentives. Congress must
amend ERISA so that the health of the American people will never be
sacrificed for the sake of corporate dollars.
489. Id. at 235-37.
490. Id. at 232-34.
